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office—the Office of Net Assessment
—on senior government decision
makers. Enter Andrew Krepinevich
and Barry Watts’s excellent biography.
Krepinevich and Watts are no strangers
to Marshall. They were a part of what
is fondly called “St. Andrew’s Prep,”
the some ninety or so people who over
the years have worked for Marshall.
Many of them have gone on to have
impacts elsewhere in government or
in the private sector, identifying and
discussing national-security issues
with the same rigor and intellectual
chops that their boss in the Office of
Net Assessment brought to the job.

Marshall left it to his subordinates to
best figure out for themselves what
net assessments were; he balanced
intellectual guidance with demanding thoroughness. In a building where
egos loom large and people posture
for influence, Marshall remained out
of the limelight, quietly but diligently
working to identify the right questions,
the ones that needed to be explored.

Krepinevich and Watts handle his story
with objectivity, aiming to show his
“intellectual contributions to US defense
strategy.” Thus the story begins with
a young Andrew Marshall, an autodidact, reading widely and voraciously
in Detroit. He goes on to the University of Chicago, earning a master’s in
economics. He then considers earning a PhD in statistics but instead
decides, in the 1950s, to work for the
then-fledgling RAND Corporation.
Marshall there meets some influential people who would change his life
and would help propel him into the
perch he has held from 1973 to today.

Marshall’s exit will leave a hole. But
this excellent biography and the
men and women he mentored are
testaments to his impact and a reminder that we have much to do to
remain competitive in the future.

It is a credit to the authors that they can
craft a thorough biography about a man
whose work is largely classified. In fact,
only one of his assessments has ever
been written at the unclassified level. But
his intellectual fingerprint has been so
prevalent that there is plenty to discuss.
The authors go into great detail about
how Marshall developed the idea of
net assessment, arguing that he looked
further out than others, identifying
issues that might challenge American

Brian McAllister Linn, professor of
history and liberal arts at Texas A&M
University, addresses here the war
between the United States and the
fledgling Philippine Republic, detailing
the prolonged guerrilla struggle that
followed. First published in 1989 and
reprinted in 2000, Linn’s book presents
the struggle between the U.S. Army and
guerrillas on the island of Luzon as a
series of regionalized conflicts. Eschewing a conventional campaign history,
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decision makers in the future. He was
so prescient that the discussions many
of us are having today about China’s rise
were presaged by what Marshall and
his office were thinking about as early
as the late 1980s and into the 1990s.
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the author argues that circumstances of
culture, ethnicity, religion, and terrain
made the challenges in each region
unique. The book demonstrates that the
Army defeated the insurgency because
commanders focused their efforts on
the idiosyncrasies of each district, rather
than following a campaign plan handed
down from headquarters in Manila.
While this flexible and decentralized
approach may not have been intentional,
Linn argues that it succeeded because
it allowed commanders the latitude
to implement measures responsive to
each local situation. This regionalized
view demonstrates the value of what
modern practitioners refer to as “mission command,” and that is what makes
this work relevant for readers today.
The book is organized into six chapters
—an introduction, four regional case
studies, and a short conclusion. The
first chapter is a sweeping synopsis of
the conventional war in the Philippines
and a brief but excellent introduction to the geography of the islands,
the Spanish colonization of Luzon,
and the nascent Filipino reformist
and nationalist movements that led to
open revolt against Spain in 1896.
In the following chapters Linn describes
counterinsurgency operations in four
numbered districts. Using several
examples in each of the districts, he
skillfully supports his claim that the
insurgency varied widely from one
area to the next. For instance, in the
Fourth District, the Department of
Northern Luzon, the Army exploited
cultural rifts in the provinces by playing antirevolutionary elements of the
population against the guerrillas, who
themselves eroded what local support
they enjoyed by heavy-handed terrorism
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against the populace. In contrast
to guerrilla campaigns in the other
districts, the insurgents in the Fourth
District suffered from poor leadership
and slipshod organization. The Army
rapidly gained the support of the local
elite, and pacification soon followed.
Linn describes the counterinsurgency in
the remaining districts. Wildly different
circumstances prevailed in each. In his
description of the Army’s responses Linn
supports the validity of his claim that the
U.S. Army eventually pacified the archipelago by making campaign decisions at
the right level and on the basis of local
circumstances, rather than by forcing
a centralized, top-down approach.
Linn makes a well-organized argument
in support of his regionalized thesis, but
his effort is not without some shortcomings. First, his case studies apply only to
the island of Luzon. Details of American
efforts elsewhere in the archipelago
would have broadened understanding
of the war. Second, Linn only makes
cursory mention of the logistical challenges presented by the terrain and
the disjointedness of the theaters of
operation. A brief but comprehensive
look at the logistics in each of the case
studies would have been appropriate,
especially a discussion of how logistical problems affected areas differently.
Finally, the text includes several photographs, but the six maps are lacking
in topographic detail that would have
visually reinforced the remoteness and
disparate nature of the four districts.
In each district, the Army prevailed because commanders implemented plans
that suited the unique circumstances
of the insurgency in their respective
districts or provinces. This decentralized approach avoided strict adherence
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to doctrine that did not suit situations
on the ground and saw the employment
of effective, sophisticated, counterinsurgency measures that reflected the local
state of affairs. Although not achieved
without controversy, the victory in the
Philippines represents the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in
U.S. military history. Though it details
a war fought over a century ago, the
book holds valuable lessons for today. It
provides not only a historical framework
for understanding counterinsurgency
but also a glimpse into the complexities
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that have confronted the U.S. military
over the last thirteen years and points to
the wisdom of a decentralized command structure for such cases. Linn
leaves the reader with a reminder that
even when the strategic objective is
President William McKinley’s “benevolent assimilation,” or the winning of
George Orwell’s “hearts and minds,”
nonmilitary efforts toward achieving it
will not work without victory over the
insurgents responsible for the instability.
LT. CDR. MATTHEW NOLAND, U.S. NAVY
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